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Although  the  distinction  is  sometimes blurred,  tradition  divides the capital 
needed on a whaling voyage into two parts: the vessel and the outfit. The vessel 
included the hull and the original masts, rigging, and sails. The outfit was a 
heterogeneous collection: spare sails, extra line and fittings, and lumber to re- 
place the masts or patch  the  hull; food  and  provisions;  whalecraft, that is, 
whaleboats and weapons; bricks for repairing the tryworks, spades and rigging 
for flensing, and staves and hoops for assembling oil-storage barrels. 
The investment in vessels and outfits at the industry’s peak was considerable. 
In 1859 the WSLreported that sixty-five whalers had sailed from New Bedford 
the previous year “at an average expense with outfits of $30,500,” or $1,017 
per crewman using the  WSL’s  estimate (8 February  1859) of thirty crewmen 
per vessel.’ If that figure was typical of all 316 vessels that the WSL said were 
in the city’s fleet at the time, the capital investment-had  they all set sail at 
once-would  have totaled  $9,638,000. Twenty years  later the industry had 
shrunk both in the number of vessels and in the capital investment per vessel, 
but  the  123 New  Bedford  whalers  were  still  valued  with  their  outfits  at 
$2,414,000 (Clark 1887b, 272). 
6.1  Vessels 
An agent’s decisions about a prospective voyage were not necessarily made 
in a particular order, but each decision limited his choices about other matters. 
Here a fairly typical order is described, though a given agent may have made 
his choices differently. 
1. Using the Warren and Pearson “All Commodities” wholesale price index as the deflator, the 
total capital investment in  1880 dollars would be $10,363,440, the per-crewman figure, $1,094 
(US.  Department of  Commerce 1975, series E-52). 
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First the agent chose a type of whale to hunt and an ocean in which to hunt 
it. These choices narrowed his options for the next decision, the type of vessel. 
If he were going after bowheads in the Western Arctic, where maneuverability 
was of paramount importance, he would likely choose a bark. For a short right- 
whale voyage in the Atlantic, he might choose a smaller vessel-a  brig, a 
schooner, or a sloop. For a sperm-whale voyage in the North Pacific, the odds 
were that he would choose a wooden sailing ship.2 
Having chosen a rig, the agent decided the appropriate size of the vessel. 
Size was recorded in tons, a measure of  capacity. Until 1865, however, there 
was only a loose relationship between measured tonnage and the number of 
cubic feet within the vessel’s hull. In that year a new system of measurement 
was adopted, and, thenceforth, a vessel’s tonnage was a close approximation 
of its capacity. The formula for calculating tonnage under the old rule3-old 
tons-was 
[(length) -  (% breadth)] X  [(breadth) X (Y2 breadth)] / 95. 
For new tons, the calculation was much more complicated and has never been 
reduced to a simple f~rmula.~  In general, the rule involved multiplying the 
length  by  the  average cross-sectional area and  dividing the result by  one 
hundred. 
Because there is no convenient way  of  converting old tons to new  ones, 
tonnage figures used in this chapter are old tons. When measurements are cited 
to illustrate the actual sizes of vessels of  different tonnages, for most vessels 
measured before 1865 only length and breadth are given, since registered di- 
mensions ignored reality and logged depth as equal to one-half breadth.5 
The choices of rig and size carried implications for manning. Although total 
2. The seven New Bedford steel-hulled, steam-powered whaling barks entered the fleet after 
1878: the Belvedere  (1880), the Lucretia (1881). the Navarch (1892), the North Star (1888), the 
William  Lewis (1888). the first Mary and Helen (1879), and the second Mary and Helen (1882). 
3. An Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties on Imports and Tonnage, 1799, Stars. at Large 
of  USA 1:675-76. The rule refers to all double-decked vessels. Virtually all whalers were double- 
decked. The British measurement rule was similar except that the divisor was 94, not 95. See 
Scoresby [I8201 1969,512. See also chapter 12 below. 
4. So complicated were the new admeasurement rules that Congress saw fit to place limits on 
the amount a ship surveyor could charge to remeasure a vessel (An Act to Regulate the Admeasure- 
ment of Tonnage of Ships and Vessels of the United States, 1864, Stars. at Large of  USA 13:69-72). 
5. According to Historical Statistics (U.S. Department of Commerce 1975,2:743)  the combina- 
tion of changes in the definition of a ton and in the method of measuring cubic footage probably 
reduced the official capacities of brigs, schooners, and sloops, but raised the official capacities of 
ships and barks. Research on whalers, however, suggests that these generalizations cannot be ex- 
tended to that class. For them the new system of admeasurement apparently reduced the official 
capacities of whaling ships by about 5  percent, on average, lowered the capacities of barks by 
about one-sixth, and reduced  the capacities of  the three smaller classes even more. For  those 
vessels for which both old and new tonnages are available (vessels that were first registered before 
1865 but continued to sail after that date), regression analysis indicates that the relationship be- 
tween old and new tons was approximately, for ships, old tons = -85.018  + 2.11 (new tons) - 
,00217 (new tons)’;  for barks, old tons = 13.370 + 1.44 (new tons) - .00113 (new tons)*; for 
others, old tons = 1.4 (new tons). 216  Chapter 6 
crew size was usually less for a bark than for a ship, for any given size a bark 
required proportionately more labor. Moreover, labor requirements differed 
among grounds. 
Lastly, the agent had to make decisions about age and provenance. Should 
he build a new vessel incorporating the latest technical improvements, or use 
a vessel that had proved itself well constructed by surviving five or ten years 
of service, or select a vessel that, well over retirement age, could be purchased 
cheaply? If  his choice did not involve new  construction, he  had  to  decide 
whether to use a vessel that had proved itself in whaling, acquire and convert 
a merchant vessel, or perhaps rerig a ship as a bark. As economic conditions 
changed and as the number of vessels hunting in a particular ground expanded 
or contracted, the desire to maximize profits and to stay economically afloat in 
the highly competitive industry continuously forced agents to make new deci- 
sions about rig, tonnage, manning, age, and provenance. 
6.2  Rigging 
The rig composition of  the American whaling fleet was never stable (see 
table 6.1). In the early years ships were the most numerous, and they remained 
so through the period of expansion, although the number of barks rose in both 
absolute and relative terms-slowly  in the  1820s and  1830s, rapidly in the 
1840s and 1850s. In  1841-45  the ratio of the number of  ships to the number 
of barks was 3.7 to 1. By  1871-75  it had fallen to 0.16 to 1, as the expansion 
of the Arctic fishery, coupled with technical improvements that made it eco- 
nomical to operate large bark-rigged vessels in other grounds as well, made 
the bark dominant. (Technical improvements are discussed in chapter 7.) 
Before the Civil War, the number of barks increased more rapidly than the 
number of ships. Thereafter, as the fleet contracted, the number of barks de- 
clined more slowly. Between 185  1-55  and 187  1-75,  for example, the number 
of ships fell by over 90 percent, but the number of barks actually rose by about 
2 percent. Tonnage tells the same story. Before 1846 barks accounted for 5.9 
percent of  total New  Bedford tonnage; their relative  share increased eight 
times over the next thirty years, and they accounted for 72.4 percent of the total 
over the last quarter of the century. 
Brigs, sloops, and schooners were not numerically important in the years 
18  16-1905. Together, they accounted for just under three-tenths of  the 1,280 
voyages to the Atlantic and Hudson Bay and for only twenty-eight of the 2,873 
voyages to the Indian, Pacific, and Western Arctic grounds in these years. Dur- 
ing the industry’s rapid expansion a few entered the fleet and remained for a 
time. More important, the end of the century saw the substitution of these ves- 
sels for barks and ships in the Atlantic and its northern extension, Hudson Bay. 
The 184 voyages they made to these grounds in the years after 1875 were al- 
most one-half of all the voyages they made between 1816 and 1905. 
Ships were usually  larger than barks, but  they  were  less maneuverable. Table 6.1  Numbers of Vessels and Tonnages, New Bedford Whaling Fleet, by 
Rigging Class, Annual Averages, 1816-1905 
A. Numbers of Vessels 
Total  Ships  Barks  Other and Unknown” 
I8  16-20 
182 1-25 
1826-30 













































































































% of Total 
~ 
Total  ships  Barks  Other and Unknown’ 
18  16-20  7,568  79.1  0.0  20.9 
1  82  1-25  14,701  87.5  0.0  12.5 
1826-30  23,105  92.4  1.8  5.8 
1831-35  44,912  92.2  6.7  1.1 
1836-40  54,685  86.6  11.5  1.9 
1841-45  72,881  83.1  15.6  1.3 
1846-50  82,035  82.4  17.1  0.5 
185 1-55  105,482  73.8  25.9  0.3 
1856-60  108,551  61.1  38.9  0.0 
186 1-65  73,026  47.7  52.0  0.3 
1866-70  58,331  31.0  68.0  1  .o 
187 1-75  39,888  16.4  82.1  1.5 
1876-80  39,217  9.9  83.0  7.1 
188  1-85  29,815  10.3  80.0  11.7 
1886-90  18,492  11.8  72.6  15.6 
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Table 6.1  (continued) 
% of Total 
Total  Ships  Barks  Other and Unknown’ 
189 1-95  10,700  2.9  67.8  29.3 
1896-1 900  6,809  0.0  64.9  35.1 
1901-5  6,810  0.0  66.6  33.4 
All years  44,278  48.1  41.9  10.0 
1816-45  36,309  86.8  5.9  7.3 
1846-75  77,886  52.1  41.3  0.6 
1876-1 905  18.64 1  5.7  72.4  21.9 
Means 
Source: Voyages Data Set. 
Notes: We counted a vessel as in the New Bedford fleet when it was on a voyage. For example, a 
vessel that sailed in 1829, returned in 1829, sailed in  1829, returned in 1830, sailed in 1832, and 
returned in 1833 is counted once in 1829, once in 1830, once in 1832, and once in 1833, but not 
in 1831 when it was not on a voyage. 
When only the sailing or arrival date of  a voyage is known, we counted the vessel in the fleet 
only in that year. Consequently, some of  the figures in this table are slightly too low. 
”he  rigging class “Other” is composed of brigs, sloops, schooners, and steam barks. 
bPanel B underreports total tonnage in a few five-year periods because there are a few voyages in 
the data set by vessels whose tonnages we do not know. 
“Where economy  of  handling  was of  special  importance,  the bark rig was 
used.”6 Thus, as opportunities increased in the Western Arctic, the bark was in 
its element. It took time to build new vessels, but technical improvement was 
hastened by rerigging ships in the now more productive configuration. 
Other differences between rigging classes could have affected productivity 
as well. The length of a typical voyage by a ship was less than that of a typical 
voyage by a bark in four of the five grounds, but only in the Atlantic was the 
difference great (see table 6.2). In general, both ships and barks remained at 
sea longer than brigs, sloops, and schooners. The choice of hunting ground 
carried with it implications for the expected length of the voyage as well as for 
the choice of  rig type and vessel size. In the latter two cases, however, over 
time, changes also occurred within grounds. The technological shifts were not, 
therefore, solely responses to changes in the geographic distribution of  eco- 
nomic activity. 
6.3  Vessel Size 
Not only were there changes in the rigging of a typical whaler, but the aver- 
age size of each class changed as well (see table 6.3). For ships, average size 
increased from just over 300 tons in the decade  1816-25  to just over 400 in 
6. Hutchins 1941, 218-19.  Hutchins is referring here to merchant vessels in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, but the point has more general relevance. Table 6.2  Average Voyage Lengths, by Rigging Class and Ground, New 
Bedford Whaling Fleet, Sailing Years 181G1905 (months) 
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-  26.2 
18.5  35.8 
25.8  37.5 
37.0  38.7 
40.5  45.9 
43.9  43.0 
-  43.6 
-  - 
-  - 
30.3  37.7 






















Means of voyages 























-  - 
-  33.1 
26.3  37.5 
35.8  40.2 
39.8  46.0 
40.8  46.5 
37.3  44.3 
35.7  - 
35.9  42.9 
36.0  41.3 





















Means of voyages 
Means of decades 
C. Brigs, Sloops, and Schooners 





16.1  14.6 
25.3 
17.9  22.8 
15.4  17.3  -  20.3  - 
15.0  18.7  -  20.3  - 
-  -  -  - 
-  -  -  - 
-  -  -  - 
-  -  -  -  - 
-  -  -  - 
-  -  - 
-  -  -  - 
-  -  - 
Source; Voyages Data Set. 
Notes: We have included only voyages that sailed from and returned to New Bedford. We have 
omitted voyages to the Atlantic or the Eastern Arctic that lasted less than two months, believing 
that they were cut short by  misfortune, and those to the Indian, Pacific, or Western Arctic that 
lasted less than seven months, believing that they  did not in  fact hunt in  those grounds. (The 
hunting ground was reported when a voyage sailed.) 
Each cell of the table reports the average of at least five voyages; averages of four or fewer have 
been omitted. Voyages are placed in decades on the basis of their sailing years. Table 6.3  Average Tonnages and Ages, New Bedford Whaling Fleet, by Rigging Class, 
18161905 
A. Tonnages: Overall Averages for the Decade" 
Unweighted  Weighted 


























































































































































B. Tonnages: Averages for Vessels Joining the Fleetd 
Modes of  Entrance 
Total  N'  Birth'  N  Transfer8  N  Rerigging  N 
Ships 
18  16-25  307.5  50  308.2  11  313.4  33  241.0  2 
0  1826-35  341.5  113  368.4  16  340.1  89 
1836-45  359.0  90  362.6  17  361.8  66  279.1  4 
1846-55  395.7  83  408.3  31  404.6  42  275.9  7 
- Table 6.3  (continued) 
Modes of Entrance 













































































































































































































































C. Tonnages: Averages for Vessels Leaving the Fleet' 
Modes of Exit 
Total  N  Loss  N  Transfer  N  Rerigging  N  Condemnation  N 
Ships 










293.4  14  334.3  1  296.0  10  -  0  234.9  1 
284.8  23  287.4  5  297.5  10  266.0  7  275.9  1 
321.8  29  339.8  12  468.1  2  275.4  9  306.6  6 
348.7  83  348.3  40  382.2  15  336.0  21  317.3  7 
367.6  162  386.0  40  378.9  66  339.4  49  352.9  7 
0  387.3  43  416.0  7  383.5  6  381.4  30  - 
0  395.5  7  428.3  3  391.0  2  350.9  2  - 
0  402.6  7  376.0  1  404.9  4  411.1  2  - 
0 
355.2  368  365.1  109  368.0  115  341.6  120  320.1  22 
-  -  0-  0  -  0-  0 
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Modes of Exit 
Total  N  Loss  N  Transfer  N  Rerigging  N  Condemnation  N 
Barks 
18  16-25  -  0- 0-  0 
1826-35  235.9  4  171.6  1  277.5  2 
1836-45  237.0  14  246.5  4  185.0  3 
1846-55  264.3  34  239.9  14  298.8  11 
1856-65  296.2  104  291.5  37  316.8  50 
1866-75  305.2  77  319.4  43  289.0  22 
1876-85  317.8  73  334.9  30  321.4  30 
1886-95  344.8  36  359.1  12  338.3  21 
1896-1 905  296.9  5  296.9  5  -  0 
Means 1816-1905  301.6  347  307.4  146  311.8  139 
1816-25  141.4  22  213.5  1  130.7  13 
1826-35  142.7  15  88.4  2  137.8  8 
1836-45  132.6  15  123.1  4  122.3  5 
1846-55  133.1  8  169.2  1  122.8  6 
1856-65  100.7  3  -  0  95.1  2 
1866-75  150.0  6  102.9  3  164.4  2 
1876-85  208.1  19  191.2  8  285.1  6 
1886-95  212.3  11  383.4  3  147.2  6 
1896-1905  198.8  11  262.6  4  166.8  6 


















































































D. Ages: Overall 
Averagesk 
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E. Ages: Averages for Vessels Joining the Fleetd 
Modes of Entrance 
Total  N  Transfer  N  Rerigging  N 
Ships 

















































































































































































(continued) Table 6.3  (continued) 
Modes of  Entrance 
Total  N  Transfer  N  Rerigging  N 
0  1866-75  18.3  9  20.4  8 
1876-85  16.2  24  21.2  17  4.0  1 
0  1886-95  17.8  14  24.9  10 
0  1896-1 905  26.0  3  26.0  3 




F. Ages: Averages for Vessels Leaving the Fleet’ 
Modes of Exit 


































11.8  13  9.0  1  11.6  10 
18.9  21  14.4  5  21.0  9 
24.1  29  20.1  12  12.5  2 
28.3  83  27.9  40  27.1  15 
31.4  160  30.8  39  30.1  65 
34.9  43  36.0  7  47.5  6 
30.9  7  31.0  3  30.5  2 
48.4  7  66.0  1  53.5  4 
-  0-  0  -  0 
29.4  363  28.3  108  28.8  113 
-  0-  0  -  0 
14.0  4  11.0  1  18.5  2 
23.0  14  21.8  4  20.7  3 
27.3  33  24.6  14  29.0  10 
26.3  104  30.2  37  22.1  50 
34.3  78  32.9  43  32.3  24 
39.9  73  39.9  31  39.7  30 
40.9  36  39.2  12  41.1  21 
50.2  5  50.2  5  -  0 
32.6  347  33.5  147  30.9  140 
7.0  21  7.0  1  6.8  12 
11.3  15  8.5  2  11.0  8 
18.5  14  16.5  4  20.8  5 
16.9  8  15.0  1  17.5  6 
19.0  3  -  0  16.5  2 
15.3  6  20.7  3  13.5  2 
24.2  19  29.5  8  19.2  6 
21.3  10  8.7  3  23.6  5 
26.5  11  19.3  4  28.8  6 

























































































































Sources: Voyages, When and Where Built, and Entrances data sets 
Note: A vessel was counted in the New Bedford fleet for each decade during which it spent any time on 
a whaling voyage. For example, a ship that sailed in  1845 and returned in 1848 was counted in the fleet 225  Capital 
Table 6.3  (continued) 
in both 1836-45  and 1846-55  as a result of that voyage. 
”The unweighted figures are the average tonnages among vessels; no matter how many voyages a vessel 
may have made during a decade, it was counted only once within a rigging class (a rerigged vessel that 
made voyages under  each rigging  within  the same decade would enter the computation twice). The 
weighted figures are the average tonnages among voyages; for example, a vessel that made three voyages 
within a decade was counted three times, whereas a vessel that made one voyage was counted only once. 
bThe  N here do not match those in panel D when either tonnage or age (year built) is missing. 
cSloops, schooners, brigs, and steam barks 
dA  vessel is considered to have joined the fleet in the decade in which it began its first whaling voyage 
from New Bedford (or managed by  a New Bedford agency). A vessel that was rerigged is treated as a 
different vessel after rerigging-that  is, a rerigged vessel enters the fleet twice. Panel E omits the birth 
category because all newborn vessels are one year old or less; age is at the beginning of the voyage. 
When the total number of vessels entering the fleet in a decade is greater than the sum of those entering 
by particular modes, it is because some entered whose pre-entrance histories we don’t know. 
“‘Birth means built for the New Bedford whaling fleet (specifically, that it made its first New Bedford 
voyage within the year of its construction or during the next year). 
*Transferred vessels either  moved  to New Bedford from another port, or moved to  whaling from the 
merchant fleet, or both. 
hThe  bark that entered the fleet in 1826-35  whose mode of entrance is unknown had a tonnage of 257.4. 
‘This figure is distended by  the presence of four of the six steam barks in the New Bedford fleet, with 
tonnages ranging from 579.9 to 634.3. 
JA  vessel is considered to have left the fleet in the decade in which it ended its last voyage from New 
Bedford (or managed from New Bedford). A vessel that was rerigged is considered to have left the fleet 
twice. Transferred vessels include those sold to the U.S. government for the Stone Fleet. The averages are 
for age at the end of the last voyage. 
kPanel D contains only weighted figures, since age (unlike tonnage, reported in panel A) changes with 
time and must therefore be dealt with at the voyage, not the vessel, level. The age is at the beginning of 
.“,“6.,.  rhn .~~.qne 
the late 1880s and early 1890s. Overall, the typical ship was almost 350 tons. 
The magnitude of the trend comes into focus in the following comparison. In 
1816 the ship Richmond was launched and began a whaling career. She was 
92 feet 6 inches long, 26 feet 11 inches wide, and was registered at 291 tons. 
Forty years later the Contest left the boatyard to join the fleet. She was 118 feet 
10 inches long, 28 feet 8.75 inches wide, and was registered at 441 tons (Work 
Projects Administration 1940). The new vessel was  28 percent longer and 7 
percent wider, and her register tonnage had increased by more than 50 percent. 
The trend in the size of ships was definitely upward, but the pattern was not 
uniform. Increases amounted to more than 5 percent per decade until 1856-65; 
subsequently, tonnage edged up only slowly. Until  1856-65  dispersion re- 
mained roughly the same (coefficient of  variation of  about 18); thereafter, it 
narrowed. The coefficient of variation fell from 1856-65 until the last ship left 
the fleet (it was only 5 in the decade 1886-95). 
Two surmises are warranted. First, larger ships were more productive than 
smaller, but the industry’s adjustment to this dimension of technology was not 
instantaneous. This is supported by a comparison of ships entering with those 
leaving the fleet. Over the first seventy years (no ship joined the fleet after 226  Chapter 6 
1885), in every decade but two a typical new entry was more than 5 percent 
larger than the average ship that left (see table 6.3). Second, the relatively slow 
adjustment can most likely be traced to the time path of the industry’s develop- 
ment.  Between  1816-20  and  1851-55,  the  number of  ships in  the  fleet in- 
creased tenfold (from an average of 3 1 to an average of 3 14). The rate of entry 
strongly suggests that there were greater than normal profits to be earned, but 
it also suggests that those opportunities may not have been long-lived. During 
the years of rapid growth, the desire to exploit short-term profit opportunities 
seems to have outweighed the marginal gain from choosing a vessel of optimal 
size, if that choice meant delaying the voyage. 
Barks, with an average size of 287 tons, were just over 80 percent as large 
as ships. While the time-tonnage profile for barks was similar to that for ships, 
the movements were slightly more accentuated. For ships the increase between 
the first decade  and  1856-65  was about 24 percent,  between  1856-65  and 
1886-95,  8 percent. For barks the comparable increases were 28 and 16 per- 
cent. There were no barks in the first decade, and few in the next two; the 
apparent increase down to  1856-65  may be no more than  a small-numbers 
illusion. Still, the Falcon built in 1817 (and entering the New Bedford whaling 
fleet in 1830)  was 101.08 feet long, 24.5 feet wide, and registered at 273 tons, 
while the Alasku built in  1867 was  122.2 feet long, 28.9 feet wide, 16.9 feet 
deep, and registered  at 340 new (460.9 old) tons. To the extent that these ex- 
amples are typical, new barks of the late 1860s were about 21 percent longer, 
18 percent broader, and, in old tons, almost 70 percent larger. 
As with  ships, it appears the efficient size of barks increased down to the 
early  1890s. In every decade but two through  1895, barks entering the fleet 
were between 3 percent and 21 percent larger than those they replaced. Unlike 
the size distribution of ships, however, that of barks widened until  1856-65. 
Thereafter, with the exception of a slight reversal in the decade 1896-1905, the 
dispersion narrowed, as it did for ships. 
For both classes there is evidence that the larger vessels hunted the more 
distant grounds and the smaller concentrated in the Atlantic and Hudson Bay 
(see table 6.4). The Western Arctic drew the largest. Vessels hunting there were 
5 to 30 percent larger than those in the Pacific; the margin between vessels in 
the Western Arctic and those in the Indian was even greater. 
Although  the hunting grounds that attracted the largest vessels were those 
that were becoming more important, interground shifts do not explain the ma- 
jor portion  of  the  observed increase in vessel  size. Instead, tonnage drifted 
upward for both ships and barks in every ground except the Western Arctic and 
Hudson Bay. The 32 percent increase in average ship tonnage between the first 
and seventh decades reflects increases of 3 percent in the Atlantic, 16 percent 
in the Indian (second to seventh decades), and 35 percent in the Pacific, with 
a 5 percent  decline  in  the Western Arctic  (reflecting  only experience  after 
1848). In Hudson Bay average tonnage rose and then fell. Among barks the 44 
percent increase in size from the second to the seventh decade is composed of Table 6.4  Indexes of Mean Vessel Tonnages, by Rigging Class and Ground, 
New Bedford Whaling Fleet, 18161905 
A. Atlantic = 100 
Eastern Arctic  Indian  Pacific  Western Arctic 
Ships 
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Source: Voyages Data Set. 
Notes: A vessel was counted in the New Bedford fleet for each decade during which it spent any 
time on a whaling voyage. No matter how many voyages a vessel may have made during a decade, 
it entered these computations only once. When only the arrival date of  a voyage is known, we 
counted the vessel in the fleet only in that year. 228  Chapter 6 
a 2.5  percent increase in the Atlantic, a 37 percent increase in the Indian, and 
an 89 percent increase in the Pacific, with 10  percent and 29 percent declines 
for those braving the Western Arctic and Hudson Bay, respectively. 
Average vessel size was increasing; barks were also becoming larger relative 
to ships. In the decade 1846-55 the barks that joined the fleet were only about 
three-quarters as large as the ships they joined. In the two decades  1856-7.5 
seventy-seven New Bedford ships were rerigged as barks; they were, on aver- 
age, 93 percent as large as the ships that remained ships.’ In the decade 1876- 
85, the barks that entered the fleet were almost nine-tenths as large as the ships 
they joined. The increasing relative size of barks reduced their relative disad- 
vantage  in  labor  costs,  while  retaining  their  advantage  in  maneuverability 
(Maran 1974). 
The examination of the average size of vessels  in the  fleet indicates that 
carrying capacity was increasing overall; however, disaggregation by  ground 
suggests that, for both ships and barks, there was little further increase in the 
size of vessels hunting in any individual ground after the early 1880s (see table 
6.4). These comparisons strongly support the conclusion that the increase in 
size resulted from two distinct phenomena-an  adjustment to new economic 
environments, and a response to new technical alternatives. On the one hand, 
larger size proved relatively more productive in the distant grounds; a part of 
the increase reflects only an adjustment to the changing geographic character 
of whaling. On the other hand, within each ground there is evidence of increas- 
ing average vessel capacity. That change was not induced by the environment; 
it indicates that the entire fleet was moving toward a more efficient technical 
configuration. 
6.4  Vessel-Related Manning Decisions 
An agent’s decisions about rig,  size, and ground had implications for the 
number of  men he would need to hire. For barks there were substantial in- 
terground differences in the relative proportions of the two factors of  produc- 
tion. (See table 6.5.) The laborkapital ratio was highest in the Atlantic  and 
successively smaller in the Indian, Pacific, and Western Arctic. At the height 
of Western Arctic whaling, for example, the laborkapital ratio there was only 
about eight-tenths of that in the Atlantic. The smaller figure in part reflects the 
use of  larger vessels in the more distant ground.* Between  18.56 and  1885 a 
bark hunting in the Arctic was, on average, about one-half again as large as a 
7. The tonnage comparison is between the average tonnage of the 77 vessels that were rerigged 
from ship to bark during the years 1856-75 (354.6 tons) and the average tonnage of the 142 vessels 
that made New Bedford whaling voyages as ships during the years 1856-75  and were not rerigged 
as barks in that period (382.3 tons). 
8. It is possible that there is some measurement bias: vessels hunting in the Atlantic may have 
been less likely to take on additional crew members after leaving New Bedford than vessels hunt- 
ing in the Pacific and Western Arctic. If this surmise is correct, however, one would expect to find 
the same interground variation in the labodton ratio for ships as for barks. In fact, there is none. Table 6.5  Mean Numbers of Crewmen per Ton, by Rigging Class and Ground, 
New Bedford Whaling Fleet, Sailing Years 1816-1905 
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Sources: Voyages and Crew Counts data sets. 
Nofes:  Voyages are placed in decades based on their sailing years. Each voyage’s number of crew- 
men per ton was figured separately, and those numbers were averaged by  rigging class, decade, 
and hunting ground. 
aOne  observation. 
bSloops, schooners,  brigs, and steam barks. 230  Chapter 6 
bark hunting in the Atlantic. For ships, in contrast, the laborkapital ratio dif- 
fered little among grounds, although those that hunted in the Indian Ocean 
used slightly more labor than others. 
Relative to their  size, brigs,  sloops, and schooners employed  much more 
labor than either ships or barks, and displayed much higher laborkapital ratios. 
By the end of the period, however, the differential between barks and the smaller 
vessels had narrowed from close to 30 to less than 20 percent. Combined with 
the demonstrated  maneuverability of  brigs, sloops, and schooners, that nar- 
rowing partially explains their increasing popularity in the years after 1885. 
Overall, barks used more labor per ton than ships, but that conclusion does 
not hold equally strongly in all grounds, and the differential decreased as the 
distance from New Bedford increased. In the Atlantic, barks employed 35 per- 
cent more labor per ton, in the Indian and Pacific, about 17 percent more, in the 
Arctic, about 10 percent. In part this reflects nothing more than the relationship 
between vessel size and ground hunted, but a simple regression using the ratio 
of  the tonnage of  barks to the tonnage of  ships and the square of  that ratio 
explains only a little more than one-half of the variance in the ratio of men per 
ton  in  the two  vessel  classes.’  The remaining  variance is not  so easily ex- 
plained. It is not related to the passage of time. It is related in part to an interac- 
tion between  the vessel  type (ship, bark)  and the  species hunted. Including 
cross terms between the proportion of baleens and the two tonnage variables 
improves the explanatory power of the model.’”  There is still a substantial un- 
explained residual, but it appears that there was some relationship among the 
9. The regression equation is 
RELMEN  = 0.6297 + 2.3941 RELTON - 2.1816 RELTON’, 
(1.561)  (2.105)  (-2.733) 
with adjusted RZ = 0.5396, F-ratio = 35.577, and Durbin-Watson = 1.713. The ratio of men per 
ton was computed for each voyage for which a crew count was available, and attributed to the 
voyage’s sailing year. Means of these ratios were computed, by  year, separately for barks and for 
ships. Means of tonnage for barks and ships were also computed, by  sailing year, for the same 
voyages. REMEN is the ratio of the mean ratio of men per ton in barks to the mean ratio of men 
per ton in ships. RELTON is the ratio of the mean tonnage of barks to the mean tonnage of ships. 
The argument is that the New Bedford fleet represented a sample of all whaling vessels. It is in 
that spirit that the t- and F-statistics are offered. To the extent that we are talking only about New 
Bedford vessels, they have no meaning. 
10. The regression equation is 
RELMEN = 1.5587 -  0.4975 RELTON -  0.0304 RELTON? 
(+3.408) (-0.358)  (-0.029) 
+ 0.5691 (RELTONB) -  0.6961  (RELTON’B), 
(+2.688)  (-2.545) 
with adjusted R2 = 0.6236, F-ratio = 25.018, and Durbin-Watson = 1.922. See footnote 9 for a 
description of RELMEN and RELTON. The proportion of oil from baleen whales was computed 
by  dividing the number of barrels of whale oil by  the total number of barrels of oil (whale and 
sperm) returned by  the voyage. The mean proportion of oil from baleen whales was computed 
separately for barks and for ships, by  year, and then the ratio of  the mean bark proportion to the 
mean ship proportion. RELTONB is the product of  RELTON and this ratio; RELTON2B is the 
product of RELTON’  and this ratio. 231  Capital 
nature of  the capital stock, the species of  whales hunted, and the labor re- 
quirement. 
6.5  Questions of Vessel Age 
Over time, vessels tended to remain in the fleet longer. Moreover, despite 
the spate of  construction of vessels built especially for whaling in the 1850s 
and 1870s, the average age of both ships and barks gradually increased (see 
table 6.3). If the first decade is excluded from the analysis for barks (there were 
none) and the last for ships (all had left the fleet), barks aged at a rate of just 
under five years per decade, ships, just under four. Thus, between  1816 and 
1905 the average age of the fleet more than tripled. Average age reached forty- 
five years for ships in the decade 1886-95  and more than forty-one for barks 
in the decade that spanned the turn of the century.” 
On average, older ships left the fleet and younger ones transferred in (see 
table 6.3). There was considerable decade-to-decade variation, and the trend 
in the ratio of the age of entry to that of exit was toward lower ratios. For barks 
the story is similar, although not identical. 
Overall, the average age of ships in the New Bedford whaling fleet was 21.1 
years, of barks, 27.5 years. For comparable periods, the average whaling life 
of ships was  16.0 years, of barks, 20.9 years. There was a greater difference in 
their physical life. Ignoring vessels that sank while whaling, the average age 
of condemned ships was 30.6 years, that of barks, 37.7. 
6.6  Questions of Vessel Provenance 
Vessels could be added to the New Bedford fleet by  construction to order, 
by transfer from the merchant marine or from some other port, or by rerigging. 
Over the years 18  16-1905,  80 ships and 47 barks entered the fleet after being 
built as New Bedford whalers; 245 ships and 178 barks transferred from other 
ports or other activities; rerigging added  12 ships and  118 barks. (See table 
6.6.) Most vessels entered the fleet as transfers, but from the point of view of 
the industry’s development, the other modes of entry are more interesting.’* 
11. The reader may wonder how it is possible that the average ages can be thirty-eight and forty- 
seven years, when the average age of a vessel when it was condemned was only thirty-seven. The 
latter is an average for the entire period  1816-1905  and is comparable to overall average ages for 
ships and barks of twenty-five and twenty-six years. 
12. The history of the bark Pacijc, out of New Bedford, is perhaps typical. “[The Pucijc]  is an 
old fashioned barque, built to ply as a packet between New York and Liverpool, which duty she 
performed  with  faithfulness and satisfaction to  her owners; and in her palmiest days bore the 
reputation of being the fastest ship out of New York; but the improvements in shipbuilding necessi- 
tated her owners to dispose [of her] . . . . She was bought by a New Bedford merchant, who, after 
altering her for the purpose, put her into the whaling trade, where for years she maintained her 
reputation as a swift sailer, until clippers were introduced. . . . [She increased] her good name 
until 1855, at which time she was fifty-three years old, and with the exception of being new topped 
and coppered, the latter at the completion of each voyage, she had undergone no repairs” (Whitecar 
1864, 24-25). Table 6.6  Modes of Entrance into the New Bedford Whaling Fleet, by Rigging Class, 
Sailing Years 1816-1905  (numbers of vessels) 
New  Transferred  Rerigged  Transferred  Kerigged 
Total  Whalers”  Whalersb  Whalers‘  Merchantmend  Merchantmen‘  Unknown 
Ships 
1816-25  52 
1826-35  114 
1836-45  89 
1846-55  84 
1856-65  22 
1866-75  0 
1876-85  I 
1886-95  0 
1896-1905  0 
Total  362 
% 
Barks 
18 16-25  0 
1826-35  21 
1836-45  47 
1846-55  110 
1856-65  86 
1866-75  69 
1876-85  25 
1886-95  3 
1896-1905  0 






































































































































Sources: Voyages, When and Where Built, and Entrances data sets. 
Notes; Vessels are placed in decades on the basis of the sailing dates of their first New Bedford voyages. 
We determined that a vessel was built as a whaler if  it entered the whaling fleet (either in New Bedford 
or elsewhere) within one year of being built. If the rerigging of a rerigged vessel-either  whaler or mer- 
chantman-was  ship to bark, or bark  to ship, the vessel  was counted in  this table twice, once for the 
beginning of its service in each of the two rigging classes. 
“Vessels, built as whalers, that began their careers in New Bedford. 
bVessels, built as whalers, that began their careers in other ports but were eventually transferred to New 
Bedford. 
‘Vessels, built as whalers.  that  sailed from New  Bedford for a while in one rigging class and later in 
another. Their history prior to their rerigging might include service from another port, but need not. 
‘Vessels,  built as merchantmen, that  eventually became New  Bedford whalers. If  they  sailed as mer- 
chantmen from other ports, their reassignment as whalers might have coincided with their transfer to New 
Bedford, but need not. 
‘Vessels, built as merchantment, that sailed from New Bedford as merchantmen, later became New Bed- 
ford whalers, and still later were rerigged. Their history prior to their rerigging might include service from 
another port, but need not. 233  Capital 
Rerigging, a change in masts and sails that converted a vessel of one class 
into a vessel of another, was important only in the middle years of the period 
(1846-75),  when it accounted for more than one-third of the entering barks. 
Almost all of the new barks had started life as ships. Rerigging represented an 
efficient market response to the rapid expansion of the Western Arctic ground, 
where large vessels  were required  but  where barks  had proved  themselves 
more efficient than ships. 
In the second half of the century, because of the declining markets for whal- 
ing products and the influence of design changes, vessels (particularly barks) 
that were specifically  designed for whaling began to replace the transfers of 
the earlier era (Chapelle  [1935]  1982, 288; see chapter 7 below  on design 
changes). In the 1850s and early  1860s new designs included modified clip- 
pers-vessels  such as the 411-ton Young Hector (116.67 feet long, 27.96 feet 
wide, and 16.33 feet deep) designed to carry 2,100 barrels of oil, the 424-ton 
Othello (118.67 feet, 28.08 feet, and 15.5 feet) capable of carrying 2,200 bar- 
rels of  oil, and the 460-ton Onward (124 feet, 28.67 feet, and 17 feet)-and, 
in the late  1860s and the  1870s, modified down-easters such as the 405-ton 
(old tonnage) Alice Knowles (1  15 feet, 27.95 feet, and 16.7 feet).13 
Before  the  mid-l840s, when  almost  any ship  or bark  (and a few brigs, 
sloops, and schooners, as well) could earn above-normal  profits, many mer- 
chant vessels were redirected to whaling. Profits fell in the 1850s, but as early 
as 1863 the  WSL (1  3 January) reported  that the recent improvement  in the 
industry’s outlook could be partly attributed to “the greater number of suitable 
vessels that have this last year been fitted for the fishery, compared with those 
that have been fitted during the last few years; the growing determination in 
the minds of merchants not to introduce into service any more such expensive 
vessels as new clippers, and bulky  ships that were never meant for whalers, 
but introduce vessels of proper size, and only such as may be built expressly 
for the business, and that can sail at a comparatively low figure.” Slightly more 
than a decade later, the WSL (1  1 January  1876), emphasizing the change in 
relative costs, reported, “Some vessels may possibly be added to the fleet from 
the merchant service; but as such ventures are attended with so heavy an outlay 
for repairs, alterations and whaling inventories, it is not probable that many 
such additions will be made.” Previously, in a less competitive era, merchant 
vessels did not need extensive alterations before they could hunt profitably. In 
1878 (15 January) the editor made the point again: “Ship-building has revived, 
and twelve whalers were built during the year, it being now apparent that at the 
present prices new vessels can be built cheaper than merchantmen can be al- 
tered into whaleships.” “The building of ships for the whaling service marks a 
new era in the business, and is an encouraging feature” (16 January 1877).14 
13. WSL6 September 1853 (Young Hector), 14 June 1853 (Othello), 15 August 1854 (Onward); 
Work Projects Administration  1940 (Alice Knowles). The old tonnage of  the Alice Knowles was 
computed from her length and width. 
14. The word ship is used in its nontechnical sense, that is, to mean vessel. This cross-section view of the bark Alice Knowles of New Bedford and the following deck plan and 
deck view of  a whaleboat were drawn by C. S. Raleigh for The Fisheries and Fishery Industries of 
the United States, compiled by George Brown Goode and published by the U.S. Commission of Fish 
and Fisheries in  1887. The Alice Knowles was built at Weymouth, Massachusetts, in 1878 and first 
registered in New Bedford in June  1879. The bark foundered at sea in  1917 on her twenty-fifth 
whaling voyage. 
At the bow of the vessel is the forecastle, the quarters of the seamen and greenhands (see ladder). 
At the stem are the captain’s quarters (see ladder), and forward of them the steerage, quarters for the 
boatsteerers, cooper, and steward or ship’s boy.  The hold is entirely used for storage of supplies 
and oil. 235  Capital 
The deck plan of  the Alice Knowles. The large I-shaped apparatus toward the bow  is 
the windlass and bitts. Immediately behind it is the forecastle’s companion, leading to 
the crew’s quarters. Then comes the foremast, the fore hatch, the tryworks, the main 
hatch, the mainmast, the pumps, two spare whaleboats stored atop the deckhouse, the 
mizzenmast, the cabin skylight (for the captain’s quarters), the afterdeck house (con- 
taining the galley), and the wheel and screw box. The four whaleboats hung from davits 
over the side are ready for use. 
The WSL proved  prophetic.  In  the decade preceding  its  first  comments 
(1  866-75),  thirty vessels had left the merchant marine to  join the New Bedford 
whaling fleet. Six other vessels whose provenance cannot be ascertained with 
certainty (they may have been merchant vessels, or whalers transferring from 
other ports) were also added. Over the same period, additions from all sources 
totaled sixty-nine. Thus, transfers from the merchant marine accounted for at 
least 43 percent of new entrants (and perhaps as many as 52 percent). In the 
next decade the only transfers were three merchantmen that joined the fleet in 
1876. Between 1876 and 1885 shifts from the maritime service accounted for 
a little more than 10 percent of the entrants. 
Ships in the New  Bedford  fleet that were built for whaling  were about 5 
percent larger than ships built as merchantmen and then converted to whalers. 
The differences were substantially greater for barks: barks built for whaling 
were  almost 23 percent larger,  and ships converted to bark  rig, 29 percent 
larger, than barks that were converted merchantmen. It appears that agents re- 
sponded  to  short-run  profit  opportunities  by  employing  almost any  “ship, 
barge, or rowboat” that would float; but, if the decision involved substantial 
long-term investment-for  either construction or alteration-they  were care- 
ful to select vessels close to optimum size. 
Both  ships and barks joining the  New  Bedford fleet  were  substantially 
younger than the ships and barks in the fleet as a whole (see table 6.3). Contem- 
poraries believed, and it remains a part of  whaling lore, that the fleet was a 
dumping ground for vessels too old to be employed profitably elsewhere. The 
experience at New Bedford indicates a different story. The WSL‘s annual re- 
view for 1876 (16 January  1877) laments that “the character of the fleet . . . 
has suffered of late by the adding of worn out merchant vessels, which obtain 236  Chapter 6 
insurance at the same rates as new ships just from the stocks.” It is not clear 
how that conclusion was reached. Between  1867 and January 1877, when the 
review was written, at least twenty-five (and perhaps as many as thirty-three) 
merchant vessels were added to the New Bedford fleet. They were old, if the 
standard was the merchant fleet or even the average age of vessels that had 
transferred into whaling in the years before  1860. The twenty-five averaged 
23.8 (or, if the four vessels with a clouded provenance whose ages are known 
are added, 23.4) years. Old, yes, but they were nine years younger than the fleet 
as a whole, which averaged 32.8 years.15 
Perhaps the answer lies in the aging of merchantmen relative to whalers. It 
is certainly possible, given the ravages of wood rot, that a twenty-five-year-old 
merchant ship was really old, while a thirty-year-old whaler-its  hull and deck 
protected by ablutions of whale oil-was  no more than mature. It is also pos- 
sible that in 1879, when the editor wrote, “[Ilt is to be regretted that so many 
vessels in an unseaworthy condition are sent out upon whaling voyages,” he 
was pointing a finger at all New Bedford whaling agents, not just the few that 
had bought merchant vessels  (WSL 14 January  1879). However, even if  the 
transfer of twenty-year-old  merchantmen degraded the fleet (a fleet that was, 
on average, always more than  twenty  years old), it was a phenomenon  that 
affected ships only in the decade  1856-65  and barks only between  1865 and 
1885. No ship moved from the merchant to the whaling fleet after 1865 and no 
bark after 1885. In the earlier years the average age of  transfers  was always 
less than twenty years and, it goes without saying, always less than that of the 
existing fleet. 
Whatever their provenance,  whaling vessels were used  intensively, in the 
sense that the interval between  voyages was typically  very  short. Well over 
one-half the vessels returning to port from whaling voyages were refitted and 
ready for sea again within three months; another 30 percent were ready within 
six months  (see table 6.7). The refitting  interval varied from one period to 
another, and there is no clear time trend, but, early and late, the interval in port 
was short. 
6.7  Questions Involving Mode of Exit 
How  a vessel exited the fleet had  no direct relation to the agent’s initial 
decisions about a voyage, but it was important to the industry’s profitability 
and, therefore, to the probability that the vessel would make another voyage. 
Some transferred out of  the New Bedford whaling fleet to join the whaling 
fleets of other ports. Some transferred out of whaling in order to engage in 
other maritime activities-either  at New  Bedford or elsewhere. Some were 
rerigged and thereby, in the terms of this study, reborn as new vessels. Some 
15. The average age of  the fleet as a whole for the decade 1867-76-that  is, of  all vessels that 
spent time on  whaling voyages during the decade-was  calculated as of  1872. 237  Capital 
Table 6.7  Intervoyage Intervals, New Bedford Whaling Fleet, 1816-1905  (numbers of 
intervals) 
0-1  Months  2-3  Months 
N%  N  % 
1816-35  132  24.0  249  45.3 
1836-60  165  9.8  719  42.5 
186  1-65  32  13.3  63  26.1 
1866-85  207  29.7  225  32.3 
1886-1905  161  46.9  56  16.3 
Total  697  19.8  1,312  37.3 
13-24 
4-6  Months  7-12  Months  Months 
N%  N%N% 
116  21.1  36  6.5  17  3.1 
622  36.8  157  9.3  29  1.7 
60  24.9  55  22.8  31  12.9 
116  16.6  115  16.5  34  4.9 
56  16.3  57  16.6  13  3.8 
970  27.5  420  11.9  124  3.5 
Source:  Intervals are calculated from sailing and arrival dates in the Voyages Data Set. An  interval is 
associated with the arrival year of  the preceding voyage, and it is on the basis of that arrival year that an 
interval is categorized into a time period. 
Nores: Because dates are recorded only as month and year, the lengths of  intervals may be misleading. 
An interval of one month may, for example, be shorter than an interval of zero months: April 1 to April 
29 is a longer period of time than April 30 to May 2. Intervals of more than  twenty-four months have been 
omitted (there were eighty-five during this period). We assume they reflect transfers out of and back into 
the New Bedford whaling fleet. 
More than eight hundred voyages that took place during this period are not represented herein, either 
because they are the last New Bedford voyages of their vessels (and thus have no succeeding voyages to 
define intervals), because they are the first such voyages (with no preceding voyages), or because some 
portion of the necessary dates is missing. 
were condemned. Some were lost at sea. In all, 107 ships and 137 barks trans- 
ferred, 120 ships and 14 barks were rerigged, 98 ships and 133 barks sank, and 
22 ships and 48 barks were condemned. (See table 6.8.) 
To  the owners the existence of a ready market for vessels in other maritime 
activities meant that they were not exposed to large capital losses in periods 
of falling whaling profits. From the point of  view of  technical change, that 
malleability meant it might well be profitable to build vessels designed for 
whaling and to continue to modify existing vessels to make them more produc- 
tive-even  when the fleet was contracting as less productive vessels shifted to 
the merchant marine. It should be noted, however, that the larger the proportion 
of vessels designed for whaling, the less malleable the capital stock. Between 
1856, when the number of vessels in the New Bedford fleet stood at 337, and 
1885, when it had fallen to 76 (the number of barks had declined from 138 to 
58), 5 new ships and 30 new barks-designed  and built specifically for whal- 
ing-were  registered and entered the fleet. An  additional 39 ships were re- 
rigged as barks. 
Transfer was less important as a means of exit than as a source of entrants, 
but it still accounted for almost four-tenths of the total. In response to changes 
in relative profit rates, owners could quickly shift capital from whaling to the 
merchant marine or vice versa. For the whaling industry, the long run was by 
no means long. Table 6.8  Modes of Exit from the New Bedford Whaling Fleet, by Rigging Class, for 
Vessels Completing Their Last New Bedford Voyages in 1816-1905 
Lost  Civil  Sold  Stone 













































2  0 
5  6 
12  9 
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28  46 
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0  0 
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26  32 
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Sources: Voyages Data Set (for date of last voyage and rigging class) and Exits Data Set (for mode of exit). 
Notes; Vessels are placed  in  decades on the basis of  the completion dates of  their last New Bedford 
voyages. The completion date is the date of shipwreck, condemnation, or destruction for a vessel that did 
not arrive home safely. In a few cases in which the completion date is missing, the sailing year is substi- 
tuted. 
The numbers of vessels exiting the fleet are not comparable to the numbers reported in table 6.6 as 
entering the fleet because of the tables’ time limits: some vessels (more ships than barks) entered the fleet 
before 1816 and exited after 1816; some vessels (more barks than ships) entered the fleet before 1905 and 
exited after 1905. 
A vessel may be counted more than once in this table, as in table 6.6, if it was rerigged during its New 
Bedford whaling career. With that exception, vessels are counted only once, although this simplifies the 
careers of some vessels. For example, the bark Alto entered the fleet as a transferred merchantman in 1844 
(she was built at Tiverton, RI, in 1826 and purchased from Fairhaven). After five New Bedford voyages, 
she was sold to Fairhaven in 1862; in  1867 she was again purchased in New Bedford. On a sixth New 
Bedford voyage (1867-70)  the Alto was shipwrecked at the Falkland Islands. Only the 1844 entrance is 
counted in table 6.6; only the 1870 exit is counted in this table. 
’Vessels lost at sea include those sunk by their crews in mutinies. 
bRerigged vessels didn’t actually exit the fleet; they exited one rigging class and entered another 
“‘Civil War” means destroyed by a Confederate raider. 
d“Condemned” means declared unseaworthy by a government official. 
‘Some vessels soldwithdrawn were transferred to other ports, either as whalers or as merchantmen; others 
remained in New Bedford but left the whaling fleet; a few were broken up soon after being sold. (A total 
of  twelve ships and ten barks are included in  this category only because they  returned safely to New 
Bedford from their last New Bedford whaling voyages. For the others, we have found evidence of sale or 
of subsequent activity from another port.) 
‘Vessels in the Stone Fleet were purchased by the U.S. government in 1861 and sunk at the entrances to 
the Charleston and Savannah harbors in an effort to block those ports. 239  Capital 
One hundred and eighteen ships entered the repair yards and reemerged as 
barks.  They were appreciably  smaller than the ships that were not rerigged 
(table 6.3, panel B),  and twice as old. This observation provides  additional 
support for the conclusions  that the expansion into the Western Arctic em- 
ployed a number of  ships that had begun to appear unprofitable  and that, at 
least after the mid-l870s, barks had emerged as the technology of choice, not 
only in the Arctic, but also in the other three grounds. 
Information  on  condemnations  and  losses  at  sea  was  also important  to 
agents. The profits of the agents and owners of  the vessels in question were, 
obviously, directly affected. Information about losses at sea aided them in esti- 
mating the potential profits from a voyage directed to one ground as opposed 
to another, and, because losses today affect insurance rates tomorrow, helped 
them assess future profit levels. Vessels were frequently lost. Of the 763 in the 
New Bedford fleet whose fate is known, 271 were lost to the hazards of the 
sea and another 26 fell to Confederate raiders during the Civil War. Those 297 
do not include 70 vessels so worn out or badly damaged that they were con- 
demned abroad during the course of a voyage. 
There were the very unlucky vessels such as the bark Atlantic (“[wlrecked 
on sailing day with 29 men lost”) and the Sarah (2nd)  (“capsized in a hurricane 
seven hours out, three men saved”) (Hegarty 1959,20,7). There was the Can- 
ada, “lost on coast of Brazil on account of intemperance of Brazilian officials” 
(Starbuck 1878,535).  There were vessels whose charts were faulty-the  Ceres 
(lst),  for example, (lost “on a Reef. . . not laid down on any chart”) and the 
Logan  (“Lost  on  Sandy Island  Reef  Jan  26,  1855; owing  to  Chart  being 
wrong”) (Wood 1831-73,2:143).  There were those such as the George Wash- 
ington (2nd),  the Pantheon, the Smyrna, and the Tobacco Plant that never re- 
turned because they were burned by their crewman in such diverse places as 
Talcahuano, Nukahiva,  St. Helena, and Honolulu (Starbuck  1878, 437, 505, 
595; Wood 1831-73,  3:107). There were those such as the Inga and the Supe- 
rior that were destroyed, usually with substantial fractions of their crews, by 
unfriendly natives (Starbuck 1878, 453, 551). There were the Ann Alexander 
and the Kathleen, which, like the Pequod, were sunk by the very whales they 
were trying to catch. The Courser was “[rlun down by steamship Ytata” (Star- 
buck 1878,466,641; Hegarty 1959, 35). Finally, there were those whose des- 
tinies  are not known-the  bark Exchange (“A  missing vessel;  her fate was 
never known”), the Monongahela (“supposed to have been lost on Fox Island 
. . . all hands lost”), and the Montezuma (“Missing-Probably  lost in a gale”) 
(Starbuck 1878, 469; Dias, “Catalogue of New Bedford Whaling Ships,” 154; 
Wood 1831-73,2:467).  The problems of agents attempting to direct the whal- 
ing fleet from hundreds of miles away are encapsulated in the experiences of 
three poorly named New Bedford vessels: the Hope (Ist),  wrecked in the Bay 
of  Islands; the Hope (2nd), “lost on Brampton Shoals”; and the Hope (3rd), 
“[llost at Island of  Coetiva” (Starbuck 1878, 399, 549, 569). 
There were clusters of losses-Confederate  raiders sank many vessels, and 
almost the entire Arctic fleet was caught in the ice pack in 1871-and  consid- 240  Chapter 6 
erable year-to-year variation, but the upward trend in the loss rates for ships 
and barks is slight. For brigs, sloops, and schooners there is some evidence of 
improvement over the last few decades (see table 6.9).16 There were, without 
question, marked differences among the loss rates for different classes of ves- 
sels and, for a given class, among hunting grounds. The crude loss rate per 
voyage for all vessels was 6.3 percent; but the figure for ships was 7.4, for 
barks 5.2, and for others 5.2.’’ Brigs, sloops, steam barks, and schooners were 
at sea for relatively shorter periods of time, and adjustment of the measure to 
reflect the period of exposure alters the inter-rig contrasts. The loss rate per 
year at sea for all classes averaged 2.7 percent. It was 2.9 for ships, 2.2 for 
barks, and 4.2 percent for other vessels.’8 Thus, other vessels go from having 
the lowest loss rate to having the highest. 
The few brigs and schooners that ventured to the Indian Ocean did not fare 
well, but it was the second safest ground for barks (after the Atlantic) and was 
reasonably safe for ships also. The Pacific was slightly less kind to ships than 
the Indian, but was the second most dangerous ground for barks. For both ships 
and barks the Western Arctic was most treacherous. For ships the loss rate was 
three times as high there as in the Atlantic (the safest ground). For barks it was 
twice as high as for the Pacific. 
On average, ships sank less frequently than barks, but the difference was not 
independent of the ground hunted. Nowhere was the loss experience of barks 
better than that of ships. In the Pacific and Western Arctic, however, the rate 
was more than  100 percent higher. These were profitable grounds, and barks 
were widely innovated in both. 
Surprisingly, the vessels lost at sea were somewhat larger than the average 
in their class, but they were about the same age. The correlation between size 
and loss rate is partly explained by the experience in the Western Arctic. That 
ground drew the largest vessels, and it was also the most dangerous. 
In the nineteenth century, vessel longevity was relatively short. Between the 
ocean below and the storm above, dampness was endemic, and vessels were 
particularly subject to the ravages of decay caused by fungi and bacteria. So 
severe was the problem that the average age of a sailing vessel in the maritime 
service has been estimated at only a dozen years. Such was not the case for 
whalers. Oil bubbling on the tryworks and barrels filled with oil stored below 
deck made a whaler unpleasant for the crew, but oil permeated the wooden 
hull of the ship and made it almost impervious to rot. 
Thus, if  they could escape unhappy crewmen, restive  natives, hurricanes, 
gales, and uncharted reefs, whaling vessels were particularly long lived. When, 
after her eleventh voyage in 1852, the 1807-built Phocion was broken up, con- 
temporaries noted that she was of a “remarkably bad model” (Starbuck 1878, 
16. The average loss rate for other vessels between 1816 and 1846 was 10.6 percent. Between 
17. The crude loss rate per voyage is (the number of  vessels lost divided by  the number of 
18.  The rate is the number of vessels lost per number of vessels at sea multiplied by one hundred. 
1846 and 1875 it rose to  14.4; between 1875 and 1905 it fell to 5.6. 
voyages) multiplied by one hundred. Table 6.9  Annual Loss Rate, by Rigging Class and Ground, New Bedford 
Whaling Fleet, 1816-1905  (vessels lost per one hundred vessel years 
afloat) 
Atlantic and  Western 
All"  Eastern Arctic  Indian  Pacific  Arctic 
Ships 
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Source; Voyages  Data Set. An  elaborate system was  devised for giving lengths to voyages for 
which some date information is missing, in order to include all voyages in the calculation of vessel 
years of voyaging. 
Nora: Voyage beginning and ending dates are recorded as month and year. The loss rate was thus 
calculated by  (1) summing the number of months spent in the ground by  vessels of a rigging type 
during a decade; (2) dividing that sum by  twelve; (3) counting the vessels of a rigging type lost in 
a ground during the decade: (4) dividing the number of  vessels lost in the ground by  the number 
of vessel years spent in the ground; (5)  multiplying the result by one hundred. 
The  voyages used in calculating this column are only those used in calculating  the ground-specific 
rates reported here. Voyages to mixed grounds and to unknown grounds are completely omitted. 
b"Other" comprises sloops, schooners, brigs, and steam barks. 242  Chapter 6 
463). The Maria was apparently better designed. In the record of her thirteenth 
whaling voyage, Starbuck notes, “This is the  ‘old’ Maria which has already 
performed [  18281 four voyages to London, three to Brazil Banks, one to Indian 
Ocean, one to Falkland Islands, and fifteen to the Pacific since 1783” (257). 
Nor was this the old Maria’s last voyage. She went on to complete twelve more 
(including an 1849 voyage during which the ship and its captain were seized 
by natives in the Johanna Islands) before she was finally condemned at Talca- 
huano, Chile, on her twenty-sixth outing in 1863.19  The 345-ton James Arnold 
(new tons), built in 1852,  completed twelve voyages before 1894 when, having 
already brought back oil and bone valued at $876,425, she was sold to new 
owners for f1,OOO. The ship continued whaling (with a crew still using hand- 
held harpoons and lances) under the Chilean flag until at least 1925, and during 
this period brought her new owners an additional $340,900 (Chatterton 1926, 
126-27;  Hegarty  1959,29). 
A final example of the longevity of the American whaler can be found in the 
1889 report of the New Bedford Board of Trade: 
The oldest vessels in the world today are the Rousseau and True Love; the 
former now lies at the wharf at the foot of North street. . . . She was built 
for  Stephen  Girard,  of  Philadelphia,  by  Nicholas  Vandusen,  and  was 
launched from the yard of the Vandusens, near Shakamaxon street, on the 
Delaware, in 1801. She is 95 feet long, 28 feet broad, and 18 feet deep, and 
registers 305 tons. Her rig was that of a full rigged ship and at the time of 
her building she was considered a fair sized vessel . . . . After doing service 
for Mr. Girard for several years, her rig was changed and she was regarded 
as one of the fastest barks sailing from Philadelphia. . . . [Iln the latter part 
of 183  1, she was purchased by the late George Howland . . .  who was exten- 
sively engaged in the whale-fishery in the early part of this century. (Pease 
and Hough 1889,70) 
From the time the Rousseau was purchased by Howland until she was retired 
in April 1886, she made thirteen whaling voyages, to the Atlantic, Pacific, and 
Indian grounds, and even from the last-a  forty-six-month venture in the At- 
lantic-the  bark returned with 1,360 barrels of sperm oil, 180  barrels of whale 
oil, and 1,400 pounds of bone. 
Not all vessels were as long-lived as the Maria, the James Arnold, and the 
Rousseau; but the average ages of the twenty-one ships and forty-six barks that 
were condemned were 30.6 and 37.7 years, respectively. The average age of 
the twelve condemned brigs, sloops, and schooners was only 24.3 years, but 
that figure is still substantially above the average for the merchant service. 
Seventy-five of the eighty-three vessels that were condemned or broken up 
experienced that fate in the course of a whaling voyage. Officers and men were 
left in such places as Sydney, Rio, he de France (Mauritius), the Cape Verde 
19. Starbuck 1878,461,569. Starbuck says that after the Maria was condemned she was “used 
as a coaler till 1866, then fitted again for a whaler.” 243  Capital 
Islands, the Bering Strait, and the Beaufort Sea. At times the vessels were too 
badly damaged to be salvaged; at times their owners determined that salvage 
would cost too much; at times, it appears, owners were victims of international 
embezzlement schemes.  Given  agents’  and  owners’  ability  to  search  out 
profits, however, there can be little doubt that the eight that were condemned 
upon their return to home port were truly worn-out. 
Vessels that were condemned were older than those that remained. They 
were substantially smaller than the average, but standardization for age would 
remove at least part of that difference. 
6.8  Trends in Vessel Costs 
The British blockade during the War of  1812 all but destroyed the American 
whaling fleet, which in  1814 consisted of only a few vessels, one from New 
Bedford. The next year, sixty-eight vessels (ten from New Bedford) left Ameri- 
can ports for the whaling grounds. In the case of the New Bedford fleet, the 
numbers rose from 10 in 18  15, to an average of  3 1.4 over the quinquennium 
1816-20,  to a peak of 320.2 during the five years 1856-60, before declining 
to 23.4 in the first years of this century. (See table 6.1.) The fleet represented a 
substantial capital investment, but estimating its magnitude depends, among 
other things, on estimating building costs. 
Unfortunately, there is no adequate series on the cost of building whaling 
vessels nor, in fact, a totally reliable-or  even a generally accepted-series  on 
the cost of  building wooden sailing vessels in general. Table 6.10 and figure 
6.1 present two sets of estimates of the real cost per ton of the latter. The first 
series, “All Data,” is derived from estimates in a wide range of  literary and 
quantitative sources. It represents arithmetic averages of the costs of building 
“a vessel” or “an average vessel” as reported in these sources. The second 
series, “US. Commissioner,” is taken from the Report of  the Commissioner of 
Navigation for 1887 and 1888 (U.S. Department of the Treasury 1888). Unfor- 
tunately, the sources of the commissioner’s estimates are not given. Although 
there  are  year-to-year  differences,  on  average  the  two  series  track  quite 
closely.20  The major differences occur in the years between 1847 and 1855. It 
appears that the commissioner’s data do not reflect the higher costs of building 
clipper ships, a design that became very important in those years. Conversely, 
because of the novelty of the design, the “All Data” series may be too heavily 
weighted by the clippers. Since the whaling fleet did draw some modified clip- 
pers (the Lapwing, Onward, Othello, and Young Hector; for example), the ac- 
tual cost of whaling vessels probably fell between the two estimates. 
Over the entire period there is little evidence of  a trend in real prices (see 
figure 6.1). Given the rapid improvements in design and equipment in the mid- 
dle of  the nineteenth century, however, a quality-adjusted index would un- 
20. The simple correlation coefficient is .79 (RZ  = .62). Table 6.10  Real Cost per Ton of New Wooden Sailing Vessels, United States, 
1814-87  (1880 dollars) 
All Data  US.  Commissioner 
Adjusted and  Five-Year  Adjusted and  Five-Year 
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Table 6.10  (continued) 
All Data  U.S. Commissioner 
Adjusted and  Five-Year  Adjusted and  Five-  Year 













































































































































Sources: For the “All Data” columns: Chapelle [1935] 1982, 1967; Chatterton 1926; Cutler 1930; 
Fairburn 1945-55; Goldenberg 1976; Hall 1884; Hutchins 1941; La Grange 1936; Lubbock 1929; 
Macy [1835] 1970; McKay 1928; Rogers 1950. For the “US.  Commissioner” columns: U.S. De- 
partment of the Treasury 1888. 
Notes: The commissioner’s prices after 1865 presumably refer to prices per new ton. We adjusted 
these figures downward by  a little less than 5 percent (on the assumption that the prices refer to 
ships-see  note 5). in order to convert them to prices per old ton. Similar adjustments were made 
to the “All Data” series. Prices were deflated by means of the Warren and Pearson “All Commodi- 
ties” wholesale price index (US.  Department of Commerce 1975, series E-52). 
doubtedly display a negative trend. (See chapter 7 on these improvements.) 
One final caveat: it is generally agreed that smaller vessels cost more per ton 
than larger ones. Thus, the cost of  the 350- to 400-ton barks and ships that 
made up the bulk of  the whaling fleet may have been somewhat higher than 
the estimates reported in table 6.10; the costs of brigs, sloops, and schooners 
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Fig. 6.1  Real cost per ton of new wooden sailing vessels, United States, 1847-87 
(I 880 dollars) 
Source: The five-year moving average data from table 6.10. Series 1 is the “All Data” prices, series 
2, the “U.S. Commissioner” prices. 
6.9  Outfits 
Although whaling vessels lasted far longer than vessels in the merchant ser- 
vice, their outfits were largely expended over the course of a voyage. The WSL 
noted with considerable pride that the ship Cortez on a voyage to the Arctic 
Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk-during  which it circumnavigated the globe- 
“came back with the same suit of  sails which she sailed with.” It went on to 
comment that the master of the Cortez, Peter Cromwell, would have managed 
the same feat on his last voyage (also a globe-girdling trip to the Arctic and 
Okhotsk), had it not been for a hurricane.2’ 
A vessel usually carried two suits of  sails. A suit for a 425-ton bark took 
21. “[The Cortez] has made three successive and successful voyages in the Arctic Ocean and 
Ochotsk sea, during a period of  seventy-six months, circumnavigating the globe upon each of 
them. During this period she has laid ten months in this port, and has brought in an aggregate of 
8,200 bbls of whale oil, 350 bbls of sperm oil, and 123.000 Ibs of  whalebone. During her last two 
voyages she has been commanded by Capt Peter Cromwell, of Holmes Hole. His energy, tact, and 
prudence are fully proved by  the successful and profitable character of his cruises. Among other 
details we may mention that from the second voyage the Cortes came back with the same suit of 247  Capital 
2,900 yards of canvas, and that suit would have cost about $1,555.22  Not all the 
outfit survived a voyage, even when the vessel was well officered and enjoyed 
nothing but pleasant weather. For example, when the Golconda was captured 
and burned by the Confederate cruiser Florida, “she was just ending her cruise, 
and had even thrown overboard the previous day her ‘try-works’ used for boil- 
ing the last whale down” (Chatterton 1926, 171). 
Although outfits varied over time and with the size of the vessel, the WSL‘s 
report (8 February  1859) of  the outfitting of  the New Bedford fleet in  1858 
indicates the mountain of  supplies needed to equip the whalers. In that year 
the agents who managed the sixty-five New Bedford vessels bought 
1. Materials: 1,200 cords of oak, 260 cords of pine, 260,000 feet of heading, 
33,000 pounds of rivets, 530,000 pounds of copper sheathing, 15,000 pounds 
of sheathing nails, 52,000 pounds of copping nails, 400 barrels of tar, 739,000 
pounds of  cordage, 32,500 feet of  boat boards, 65,000 feet of  pine boards, 
205,000 yards of canvas, 13,000 pounds of cotton twine, 234,000 yards of as- 
sorted cloth, 39,000 pounds of white lead, 5,200 gallons of  linseed oil, 400 
gallons of turpentine, 13,000 pounds of other paint, and 120 casks of powder. 
2. Food and provisions: 13,650 barrels of flour, 260 barrels of meal, 10,400 
barrels of beef, 7,150 barrels of pork, 19,500 bushels of salt, 97,500 gallons of 
molasses, 39,000 pounds of  rice,  1,300 bushels of  beans, 39,000 pounds of 
dried apples, 78,000 pounds of sugar, 78,000 pounds of butter, 19,500 pounds 
of cheese, 16,300 pounds of ham, 32,500 pounds of codfish, 78,000 pounds of 
coffee, 14,300 pounds of tea, 13,300 pounds of raisins, 1,950 bushels of corn, 
2,600 bushels of  potatoes, 1,300 bushels of  onions, 400 barrels of  vinegar, 
2,000 pounds of sperm candles, 32,500 barrels of fresh water, 130,000 pounds 
of tobacco, 2,800 gallons of new rum, and 1,000 gallons of other liquors. There 
were also bakers’ bills for $16,250, $9,750 for preserved meat, $6,500 for tin- 
ware, and $3,900 for medicine. 
3. Whalecraft and  whale-rendering equipment:  1,000,000 barrel  staves, 
1,000 tons of iron hoops, 450 whaleboats, 36,000 feet of oars, 8,500 iron poles, 
22,500 pounds of flags, 23,000 bricks, and 200 casks of lime. In addition, the 
agents paid $2,600 for hoses and bellows and $9,750 for whaling guns, bombs, 
and lances. 
4.  Refitting  and  miscellaneous expenses:  $65,000 to  ships’  carpenters, 
$32,500 to  ships’ chandlers, $19,500 to  riggers, $13,000 to  blockmakers, 
$52,000 to blacksmiths, $13,000 to caulkers, $22,750 to sailmakers, $16,250 
to painters, $26,000 to sparmakers, $4,875 for nautical instruments, $19,500 
for stevedores, $4,875 for trucking, and $5,200 for towing and pilotage. These 
sails which she sailed with, and the same thing would have occurred upon her return from her last 
voyage if she had not experienced a hurricane. This is exceedingly creditable to the good old ship, 
and good evidence of  her many good qualities. Another fact is equally creditable to her com- 
mander. On her last voyage, with three exceptions she brought back her entire original crew; and 
on her previous voyage all her men except two” (WSL  26 April 1853). 
22. Hall 1884, 28. The $1,555 is in 1880 dollars. The nominal cost was $1,400. The whaleboat was typically packed with gear. Across the starboard side of the boat in this picture, 
and extending over the bow, are two toggle harpoons, both attached to a line. The line comes from 
the large tub amidships on the port side (holding 275 fathoms [  1,640  feet]), runs to the stem, around 
the loggerhead, then forward to the box in the bow,  and from the box to the harpoons. When one or 
both harpoons struck a whale, the line would run through the gap in the very tip of the bow (the gap 
is called the bow-chocks). A second, smaller tub of line (75 fathoms [450  feet]) is situated forward 
and to the starboard of the large tub. Two spare harpoons lie at the side of the boat to port, and three 
lances lie to starboard. Paddles are placed under the thwarts at the rowing positions. On the starboard 
side toward the stem, two boat spades are stored, ready to the hand of the boatheader. The unseated 
mast extends over the stem on the starboard side, while the steering oar is parallel to it on the port 
side. The tiller would have been used only when the boat was under sail. When the sail was in use, 
the mast was seated forward, in the horseshoe-shaped mast-hinge block. The indentation on the port 
side of the forward thwart is called the clumsy-cleat. The harpooner placed his left thigh in the cleat 
to steady himself while preparing to dart his harpoons. (For a left-handed harpooner, the clumsy- 
cleat would be on the starboard side.) Three oars are arrayed on the starboard side, and two on the 
port. The forward starboard oar is the harpooner’s oar. Although it is difficult to see in this drawing, 
the five oars are of different lengths. “The boats were dry and rode ‘as gracefully as an albatross . . . 
for lightness and form, for carrying capacity compared with its weight and sea-going qualities, for 
speed and facility of movement at the word of command, for the placing of men at the best advantage 
in the exercise of their power, by the nicest adaptation of the varying length of the oar to its position 
in the boat, and lastly, for a simplicity of construction which renders repairs practicable on board 
ships, the whaleboat is simply as perfect as the combined skill’ of generations of boatbuilders could 
make it” (Ansel 1978,2, quoting William h4. Davis’s Nimrod ofthe Sea). 250  Chapter6 
figures do not include the $13,000 advanced the captains for expenditures at 
sea, the $130,000 advanced to crews, and the $39,000 used  to fill the slop 
chests. This last involved the purchase, among other things, of 3,150 monkey 
jackets, 4,550 pairs of thick trousers, 1,200  pairs of thin trousers, 5,200 woolen 
shirts, 3,250 cotton shirts, 3,900 undershirts,  3,900 pairs of  drawers,  7,800 
pairs of  socks and stockings,  1,800 pairs of  blankets,  1,300 bed comforters, 
6,500 pairs of shoes, 1,500  pairs of boots, 1,200 smocks, 1,350 tarpaulin hats, 
1,600 palm-leaf  hats,  1,600 guernsey frocks, 3,900 tin  pots  and pans,  and 
4,700 jackknives. 
Heavy expenditures on materials for refitting  at sea were necessitated by 
the punishment  vessels  absorbed. The reports of  those  all but  destroyed  by 
hurricanes, typhoons, or uncharted reefs are many. Here are three examples. 
In mid-December 1856  the Benjamin Tucker limped into Honolulu with jury 
masts. On 3 November  she had lost her bowsprit,  fore- and mainmasts, and 
mizzen topmast in a hurricane. Over fourteen days, while “the sea was so rough 
and the vessel rolled so that it was impossible to stand up without holding on 
to the rail,” the crew, using “broken spars, spliced rope, and torn sails,” man- 
aged to jury-rig the fore- and mainmasts so that the vessel could maneuver into 
smoother waters and eventually sail into Honolulu. The damage was so exten- 
sive that it took the repair yard more than two months and $14,000 to prepare 
the Benjamin Tucker for sea again (WSL 10 March, 5 May 1857). 
In 1858 Captain Benjamin Kelley and the crew of the Henry Kneeland, lying 
at anchor off the coast of Patagonia, found themselves in a hurricane that lasted 
thirty hours. The ship lost her anchor and chains, and the crew were obliged to 
“cut away all three masts and jib boom to save the ship from going ashore.” 
When the storm was over, Captain Kelley and his men “rigged up juryniasts, 
took the foreyard for a foremast, slung the three topsail yards for lower yards, 
and bent the topsails for courses.” It took them two days to get the ship ready 
for sea.23 
Not only hurricanes made repairs at sea vital. While cruising off Guam in 
March  1860, the captain of the Rapid discovered that someone had set the 
vessel afire. In order to control the fire, the crew bored holes in the hull below 
the  waterline  and  flooded  the  hold  with  nine feet of  water. “The ship was 
pumped and baled out in thirteen hours. The lower deck beams, carline and 
ceiling were badly charred, and the foremast burnt  some” (WSL 11 and  18 
December 1860). 
Once the fire damage was repaired, they continued the voyage. On 26 June, 
while the  vessel  was  dodging  ice  on the  Sea of  Okhotsk,  a  heavy  current 
pushed her onto a rock where she stuck fast. When the ship finally floated off, 
there were forty-two inches of water in the hold. After five hours the crew were 
able to pump it out, but they discovered that the Rapid was taking additional 
23. WSL  25 January 1859. The course is the lowest sail on a square-rigged mast. The crew of 
the Henry Kneeland were assisted by  the crew of the Harrison, which had also ridden out the 
hurricane. “The Harrison sustained no damage beyond the parting of  her best chain.” 251  Capital 
water at a rate of  fifteen inches an hour, They built a box pump that allowed 
them to control the flow, fought free of the ice, and sailed for Ayan, a small 
Russian town on the coast. 
Since there were no facilities to heave down the ship (which was leaking at 
the rate of  thirty-six  to thirty-eight thousand strokes per twenty-four hours), 
they “discharged the cargo and hauled the ship up on the beach at low water.” 
There they “found the false keel was gone, about 20 feet [of the] stem and keel 
badly  split and chafed to pieces,  [the] copper and  sheathing gone from the 
keel, say from 10 to 12 feet, [and the] garboard streaks [sic]  open on both sides 
as far as the keel was split.”24  Using what tools they had, they were able by 21 
July to build  a box of  tarred  blankets and pine plank that covered the scar. 
Finding that the vessel was “comparatively tight,” they reloaded, and sailed on 
31 July. 
After losing the anchor and forty-eight fathoms of chain on 7 August, they 
sailed eastward; but, while working her way  through a dense fog, the Rapid 
collided  with  the bark Jeannette  Winslow. The accident  cost the  Jeannette 
Winslow a fly, jib boom, and starboard boat; the Rapid lost a fly jib and tore 
the foresail. It was too much for Captain Francis D. Drew’s vessel; she gave up 
the voyage at Honolulu  in October (WSL 11 and  18 December  1860). Drew 
managed to send home 1,512 barrels of whale oil and 15,660 pounds of bone 
(Starbuck 1878,537). 
The crew’s ability to effect repairs at sea was important also because cap- 
tains and agents were convinced that repair facilities in foreign ports exploited 
whalers. There were frequent charges that unscrupulous officials condemned 
damaged whaling vessels and forced their captains to sell them to local inter- 
ests at far less than their true value. In 1858, for example, the WSL  (17 August) 
complained loudly about the treatment of the bark George Washington. “This 
vessel-recently  a whaler of this port, and which was condemned at Sydney, 
N.S.W.,  in November  1857 as unseaworthy  and subsequently sold to parties 
there, has been repaired at an expense not exceeding E25, loaded, and sent out 
to Callao. Her name has been changed to the ‘Statesman.”’ The WSL  (22 Janu- 
ary 1867) reported, “The vessels engaged in the Greenland whaling . . . are at 
far less expense than those in the North Pacific,” in part because, aside from 
repairs at sea, “[tlhere is no re-fitting ships at any but home ports.” 
Expenditures  on food, provisions,  and whalecraft  need little explanation. 
Crewmen had to be fed, and, given the unstructured nature of the voyage, there 
was never a guarantee that the vessel would be near a port when food ran out. 
The food shipped was supplemented by fish caught and fresh fruit purchased 
along the way. Paita, Peru, for example, had “long been a famous resort for the 
sperm whaling fleet in the Pacific, and fruits and vegetables brought from the 
fertile valleys of Puna, can be obtained in great abundance, and until the im- 
mense emigration to California at reasonable prices” (WSL  3 August 1852). At 
24. Garboard srrakes are the planks next to the keel of a wooden ship. 252  Chapter6 
Honolulu  food was expensive; once the Gold Rush had run  its course, San 
Francisco became an attractive substitute. Quoting approvingly from the San 
Francisco Price  Current of 9 November  1860, the WSL (25 December  1860) 
reports, “Provisions can be obtained here at much less cost than at the Sand- 
wich Islands, with the trivial exception against us in Sugar and Molasses. Re- 
cent quotations in the Honolulu papers note Beef worth $18; here it can be had 
for $16, and a good article of California packed  at $10  @  $12. Pork can be 
had here at $15 @ $16; there it costs $20 @ $22. Bread costs at Honolulu 6% 
@ 7 cents; here it is worth 3% @ 4 cents.” Overall the cost of food and provis- 
ions ran about $5.00 per crewman per month.2s 
The description of  the dangers of  the hunt given in chapter 5  suggests the 
loss rate of  whaleboats; the estimates in chapter 4 of the numbers of whales 
wounded but  not captured suggest the  speed at which  harpoons  and lances 
were expended. Even success was not without cost. Each whale that was killed 
and towed back to the vessel required enough staves and iron hoops to make 
from 10 to 250 barrels. 
It should be clear that the capital investment in outfits was not trivial, but for 
the early years there is a paucity  of direct observations on the level of that 
investment. Obed Macy ([1835] 1970, 221) puts the cost of a three-hundred- 
ton  whaleship  in  1835 at  $22,000 and  the  cost  of  outfits  at  an  additional 
$1 8,000.26  Elmo  Hohman estimates  the  outfitting  cost for a sperm-whaling 
voyage in  1844 at $19,774.75, for a right-whaling voyage in the same year at 
$17,129.45. He puts the value of  a vessel employed in either at $31,224.72.27 
There  is more  direct  information  for  later years.  The outfitting  costs  of 
thirty-six voyages operated by Joseph and William R. Wing between  1860 and 
1870 are reported  in  Martin  Joseph  Butler’s  study  (1973,  87) of  the  Wing 
agency. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the costs include advances to the 
crew, nor can one disentangle the expenditures on food and other items. For 
the period of the 1870s and early 1880s the outfitting records of the Milton for 
four voyages to the Pacific and one to the Atlantic  (1869, 1871, 1876, 1880, 
and 1884-85)  have been preserved (Milton and Callao Account Books). Table 
6.11 brings together these direct observations for the period 1860-85. 
An analysis of the Milton and Wing outfitting costs (assuming that the latter 
do not include advances to the crew) is suggestive. A simple regression (table 
6.12, panel A) of  the total  cost of  an  outfit  on new  tonnage, new  tonnage 
squared, a measure of expected voyage length (the average voyage length of 
vessels returning from the designated ground over the previous  three years), 
and the year of sailing, for the forty-one voyages reported in table 6.11, gives 
25. Hohman 1928, 267-71,325;  appendix 5C. Hohman believes that the real content of subsis- 
26. The real cost in  1880 dollars was also $18.000. 
27. Hohman 1928,325.  These figures are all in nominal dollars. The costs in 1880 dollars would 
be $13,235 for Macy’s Nantucket vessel and $25,681 and $22,246 for Hohrnan’s sperm-whaling 
and right-whaling  outfits. Hohman puts  the  value of  the vessel at  $31,225  ($40,552  in  1880 
dollars). 
tence per man changed virtually not at all, at least during the period  1844-65. Table 6.11  Cost of Outfits, New Bedford Whaling Voyages, Sailing Years 1860-85 
Voyage Length  Nominal Cost  Real Cost' 



























A. R. Tucker 
John Dawson 
Awashonks 









































































































































































28,114 Table 6.11  (continued) 
Voyage Length  Nominal Cost  Real CostA 
Sailing Year  Name of Vessel  Rigging  Old Tons  New Tons  Ground  (months)  ($)  ( 1880 $) 
1866  Brewster  bark  215.5  170.0  Atlantic  lost  25,522  14,668 
1866  Xantho  bark  325.0  206.3  Atlantic  36  37,461  2 1,529 
I867  John Dawson  bark  237.4  173.5  Atlantic  36  34,068  2 1,030 
1867  Charles W.  Morgan  bark  351.3  313.8  Western Arctic  49  35,182  21,717 
1867  Kathleen  bark  306.1  205.5  Indian  48  32,255  19,910 
1867  Stafford  bark  205.8  155.2  Atlantic  34  24,672  15,230 
1868  A. R. Tucker  bark  218.1  130.0  Atlantic  22  19,456  12,314 
1868  Atlantic  bark  366.6  292.0  Indian  48  37,722  23,875 
1868  Sunbeam  bark  359.5  255.5  Pacific  38  35,442  22,432 
1868  Triton  bark  299.8  264.8  Atlantic  40  35,095  22,212 
1868  Laetitia  bark  275.0  208.2  Pacific  44  34,644  2 1,927 
1868  Emily Morgan  bark  367.8  365.0  Western Arctic  lost  48,215  30,516 
I869  Milton  ship  388.0  373.0  Pacific  44  40,162  26,597 
1870  John Dawson  bark  237.4  173.5  Indian  27  27,277  20,205 
1870  Awashonks  bark  342.  I  376.3  Western Arctic  lost  39,545  29,293 
1873  Milton  ship  388.0  373.0  Pacific  36  36,932  27,768 
1876  Milton  ship  388.0  373.0  Pacific  42  25,126  22,842 
1880  Milton  ship  388.0  373.0  Atlantic  44  17,618  17,618 
1885  Milton  ship  388.0  373.0  Pacific  lost  25,197  29,644 
Means  302.6  253.9  28,464  19,323 
Sources: Most of the nominal outfitting costs are from Butler 1973, 87. Those for the Milton are taken from Milton and Calla0 Account Books. Values for rigging 
type, old tons, ground, and voyage length are from the Voyages Data Set. Values for new tons come from Work Projects Administration 1940. 
”Nominal costs are converted to real costs using the Warren and Pearson “AH  Commodities” wholesale price index (US.  Department of Commerce 1975, series E-52). Table 6.12  Factors Influencing Outfitting Costs, New Bedford Whaling Voyages, 
Sailing Years 1860-85 
A. Total Cost, All Observations 
Dependent Variable: 
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B. Cost per New Ton, All Observations 
Dependent Variable: 
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C. Cost per New Ton, Omitting One Outlier 
Dependent Variable: 
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Table 6.12  (continued) 
~~ 
D. Cost per Old Ton, All Observations 
Dependent Variable: 
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*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 10 percent level. 
an initial framework for such an analysis. Although subject to substantial varia- 
tion, more than one-half of the total real cost of an outfit can be explained by 
the four variables. 
The coefficients all have the expected sign, and all but new tons squared are 
significant at the  10 percent level or better. It obviously cost more to outfit a 
larger vessel than a smaller one, but the increase in cost  was  probably  not 
proportional  to size. The average cost of the forty-one outfits was $19,183. 
Thus, the difference in outfitting costs between the smallest vessel in the enu- 
meration (the 130-ton A. R. Tucker) and the largest (the 376-ton Awashonks 
and 380-ton Abraham Barker), when expected voyage length and year are set 
at their average values, was $6,311.9. By the same measure (with tons, tons 
squared, and year set at their average levels), the difference in outfitting costs 
between  a vessel  scheduled for the shortest expected voyage length  (18.3 
months to the Atlantic in  1868) and the longest (48.4 months to the Pacific 
in  1864) was $4,660. Vessels at sea longer than average, however, certainly 
reprovisioned more than once, and those reprovisionings are not captured in 
the outfitting costs. 
A different, and perhaps more interesting,  specification, designed to take 
account of the increase in average vessel size over time, attempts to explain the 
per-ton cost of outfitting (table 6.12, panel B). Almost one-half of the variance 
is explained by the three independent variables (tons squared, expected voyage 
length, and year). Given an average cost of outfits of $75.55 per ton, the im- 257  Capital 
plied difference between the smallest and the largest vessel is $45.48, between 
the shortest and the longest expected voyage, $15.98. 
Both of these exercises raise questions. There is a problem about the role of 
time. The regressions indicate that costs rose over time, although, in the per- 
ton case, its impact is somewhat dampened. In neither case, however, has time 
been assigned an important role in the analysis, even though at first glance it 
appears to have been a more powerful determinant of costs than expected voy- 
age length. This apparent lapse was deliberate-YEAR  outliers have a dispro- 
portionate effect on the regression analysis. The removal of  a single voyage 
(the  1885 voyage of the Milton) dramatically reduces both the size and the 
significance of the coefficient on YEAR (see table 6.12, panel C).  The removal 
of no single voyage affects the coefficients on the other variables significantly. 
Moreover, incorporation of the estimates for 1835 and 1844 supports the belief 
that there was not a significant long-term increase in the real costs of outfits. 
A  second question is raised by  the use of  “new” rather than “old’ tons. 
The old calculation, based on the assumption that depth was equal to one-half 
breadth, often mismeasured the carrying capacity of  a vessel (see chapter 7), 
but the agent knew its actual capacity. Luckily, for both the Wing vessels and 
the Milton, data on new tons-measurements  that do reflect actual capacity- 
are also available. Using old tons (table 6.12, panel D), although leaving the 
coefficients largely unchanged, reduces the explanatory power of the second 
model from 48 to 22 percent.**  Thus, it seemed appropriate to substitute the 
new measure for the old in this analysis, since, to the extent that agents’ deci- 
sions were tempered by their estimates of the capacities of vessels, those esti- 
mates were probably  based on figures similar to the revised tonnages. It is 
unfortunate that new tonnages could not be computed for the vessels that had 
passed out of the whaling fleet by  1865. 
6.10  Conclusions 
Even if  there had been no technical change, the years from 1816 to 1906 
would have seen a substantial shift in the profile of the stock of whaling ves- 
sels, but much less change in outfits. 
The smaller classes of  vessels-brigs,  sloops, and schooners-were  im- 
portant only during the early years of rapid expansion and at the end of  the 
period, when voyages to Hudson Bay and Davis Strait became relatively im- 
portant. Ships constituted the bulk of the fleet over the first quarter century; 
after the 1840s the number of barks grew and eventually exceeded the number 
of  ships. The ratio of  ships to barks fell from almost ten to one in the early 
1830s to one to thirty in the early 1890s. Part of the substitution can be attrib- 
uted to technical changes that reduced the manning requirements for barks; 
28. In the variant with old tons, however, the significance levels improve across the board. 258  Chapter 6 
part reflects the benefits realized in the Western Arctic from their greater ma- 
neuverability, outweighing their continued higher manning ratios. 
In general, ships were between one-fifth and one-sixth larger than barks; 
more important, both classes increased in size over time, particularly during 
the first five decades. Between  1816-25  and  1886-95  the  size of  ships in- 
creased by about one-third, the size of barks, by one-half. Larger vessels were 
more productive  than smaller ones, but adjustment to the more efficient size 
was slow. In part the sluggish response reflects the time it took to shift the 
fleet to the Pacific and Arctic,  where there were special advantages to size. 
Interground shifts, however, do not come close to explaining all of the increase 
in average size. Larger vessels were more productive in every ground, but the 
slow pace of  substitution need not have been the product of  either custom or 
irrationality. Given the malleability of the capital stock-there  was an almost 
unlimited supply of merchantmen that could be drawn into the fleet-and  the 
large potential profits during the period of rapid expansion, ownership of any 
vessel capable of hunting was more rewarding than investment in the best ves- 
sel still in the shipyard. 
The majority (three-fifths) of New Bedford vessels transferred into the fleet 
from other ports or maritime activities; almost one-fifth were built as New 
Bedford whalers; another one-fifth were whalers that were rerigged. The rela- 
tive importance of the new and rerigged vessels increased rapidly as the indus- 
try began to stagnate, and then to decline. As market pressures increased, ships 
were rerigged as barks to hunt bowheads in the Western Arctic; newly built 
vessels were often barks of the modified clipper design-a  combination that 
brought with it excellent handling qualities. 
Finally, whaling was a risky business. Of the 763 vessels that can be traced, 
almost 40 percent were lost at sea or, during the Civil War, to the assaults of 
Confederate raiders. While most vessels made more than a single voyage, the 
loss rate per voyage was  still a healthy  6 percent,  and that figure does not 
include the seventy vessels that were so badly damaged at sea that they were 
condemned-most  often in a foreign port-during  the course of a voyage. 
Technological change aside, there is less evidence of change in outfitting 
costs over time, although costs for a long voyage in the Arctic or North Pacific 
were expected to be higher than for a short cruise to the South Atlantic. No 
matter what the destination or length of voyage, outfitting costs were not triv- 
ial; on average they accounted for almost two-fifths of the total capital cost of 
a whaling voyage. 
Outfits  included  food (although  fresh  produce  was  purchased  along  the 
way), the harpoons, lances, and whaleboats used in the hunt itself (to say noth- 
ing of the barrel staves needed to transport the oil home), and a mountain of 
supplies that would enable the crew to repair the vessel should it fall prey to 
weather, ice, uncharted rocks and shoals, or the machinations of an angry crew- 
man. Sabotage, particularly arson, was not uncommon. Supplies included not 
only extra suits of  sails, spare masts, and iron or hemp for rigging, but also 259  Capital 
enough lumber and copper to permit the crew to replace and resheath large 
sections of the hull. 
Taken together, the capital invested in a typical whaling voyage amounted to 
something in the neighborhood of  $50,000 (1880 prices)-a  substantial sum 
in the middle of the nineteenth century. An agent’s decisions about the compo- 
sition of that investment were crucial to the profitability of the enterprise. 